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The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
by Professor Christopher Bovis and Ms Tracey Reeves
In this article the authors expose the mechanics of the newly adopted 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and examine its thrust and its 
interrelation with the EU legal structure and national laws.
INTRODUCTION
The Nice Intergovernmental Conference of December 
2000 (hereinafter the Nice IGC) has resulted inter alia in 
the formal adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(hereinafter the Charter) by the member states. The 
Charter was the outcome of laborious efforts of the 
"Convention", an ad hoc body established by the European 
Council in late 1999 in order to materialise the changes in 
the field of Justice and Home Affairs brought about by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The Charter serialised in a single
instrument existing legal principles of human rights and o o r r o
fundamental freedoms scattered in various legal sources at 
international and national levels. It also codified 
provisions found in the constitutions of member states 
relating to civil and political rights as well as social and 
economic rights.
The Charter, although epitomising the mandate of the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties to bring into the 
(supranational) EU law making structure policies relevant 
to justice and home affairs, it has opened a debate over its 
legal status and its interface with acquis communautaire and 
national laws. Despite of the fact that the Charter draws 
legitimacy from the EU Treaties, the ECHR, case law of 
the European Court of Justice and various 
intergovernmental agreements amongst the member states 
of the European Union, its legal status caused a great deal 
of controversy. During the Nice IGC, the European 
Council was confronted with two options: incorporate the 
Charter into the EU Treaties or solemnly declare its 
conclusion. Reality prevailed and the Charter received a 
solemn political declaration by the European Council. 
However, many European institutions favour the formal 
incorporation of the Charter into EU law in order to 
disperse to European citizens the rights and freedoms 
envisaged therein.
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Drawing from its mixed heritage of rights, the European 
Union has created a Charter containing an unusual 
amalgamation of rights. It combines old and new, and 
brings together rights of national, international and
European origin. The Charter rejects the international 
tradition of segregation between civil and political rights 
on the one hand, and economic and social rights on the 
other, as found in the respective instruments of the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). In addition to 
aggregating established civil and social rights, theoo o o o '
European Charter incorporates some more contemporary 
concerns, such as data protection and eugenics. Finally, 
the Charter contains certain rights specific to the 
European Union and seeks to make the Union itself more 
transparent and accountable. This novel and eclectic 
parcel of rights is endorsed by the Commission on the 
basis that it emphasises 'the indivisibility of rights' (COM 
(2000) 644). The Charter may be viewed as a unique 
collection ot the rights and values recognised by the Union 
as applying to its citizens.
The Preamble to the Charter asserts a need to 
strengthen the protection of fundamental rights 'in the 
light of changes in society, social progress and scientific 
and technological developments' (which may explain the 
inclusion of some of the more contemporary rights). The 
rights are placed in the context of supporting Europe's 
general aims of an ever-closer union and economico
development. The Preamble refers to common values and 
identifies the 'indivisible, universal values' of human 
dignity, fundamental freedoms, equality and solidarity. In 
addition, it talks of placing 'the individual at the heart of 
its activities'.
Whilst establishing these common values, ando '
recognising the individual, the Charter reaffirms its 
commitment to the principle of subsidiarity and 
acknowledges respect for 'the diversity of the cultures and 
traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national 
identities of the Member States'.
Finally, the Preamble places the individual rights in a 
broader, social context stating that 'ejnjoyment of these 
rights entails responsibilities and duties with regard to 
other persons, to the human community and to future 
generations'. This statement may be a reflection of the
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collective nature of human rights and espouse a collective 
responsibility. Alternatively, the statement may be seen as 
an aid to construction ot the rights within the Charter. Of 
these rights, some may not be absolute, or lack precision, 
whilst other rights may conflict with each other and have 
to be read and interpreted in conjunction. The 
recognition of freedom of the sciences (Article 13), for 
instance, might lend itself to interpretation in the light of 
such factors mentioned in the Preamble's statement.
The fundamental rights are set out under seven broad 
chapter headings; dignity, freedom, equality, solidarity, 
citizens' rights, justice and general provisions. As 
indicated above, these cover a range of civil and political in 
addition to economic and social rights and draw from 
national, international and European influences.
Chapter I, Dignity, contains five articles, recognizing 
human dignity (without defining it), the right to life, 
integrity of the person (both physical and mental), 
prohibition of torture, and of slavery. All of these are 
familiar fundamental rights to be found in international 
documents (including the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the European Convention on Human 
Rights, ECHR).
Chapter II, Freedoms, lists fourteen different freedoms 
or rights and in this chapter there is a mix of civil and 
political, economic and social rights granted recognition. 
These cover the rights to liberty, to asylum, to protection
from expulsion, the right to education and the right tor ' o o
marry and found a family, and the freedoms of thought, 
expression, and assembly. The right to privacy (Article 7) 
is included and a separate article (Article 8) is added, 
recognising a specific right to protection of personal data. 
The right to property (Article f7) includes protection of 
intellectual property. A right to work, and freedom to 
choose an occupation (Article 15), sits alongside a 
separate freedom to conduct a business (Article f6). 
Academic freedom is recognised (Article 13) together 
with freedom of the arts and scientific research.
Chapter III, Equality, starts (in Article 20) by affirming 
one arm of the rule of law; the principle of equality before 
the law. It then reaffirms (in Article 21) the Union's own 
commitment to non-discrimination on a broad range of 
grounds (including age and sexual orientation), echoing 
the provisions of Article 1 3 of the EC Treaty. Respect by 
the Union for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity is 
assured (in Article 22). Equality between men and 
women is granted a separate provision of its own, again 
following the Union's long history in this field. Various 
groups are then given separate mention; children, the 
elderly and those with disabilities.
Chapter IV, headed Solidarity, deals mainly with work- 
related rights, both collective (such as bargaining and 
action) and individual (including working conditions and 
dismissal), and the protection of children and family in
relation to work. In addition, this Chapter recognises 
entitlements to social security and healthcare. Finally, the 
Union affirms its support for environmental and 
consumer protection (Articles 37 and 38).
Chapter V deals with Citizens' Rights. These refer to 
rights that apply as a citizen of the European Union. Part 
of this chapter seeks to make the Union more transparent 
and accountable. It includes the right to good
O O
administration by the Union, the right of access to Union 
documents, and the right of access to a Union1 o
Ombudsman. In addition, there are wider rights thatJ o
attach as a citizen of a frontier less Europe such as the 
right to vote and stand at elections (both European and 
municipal), free movement, and reciprocal diplomatic 
protection by Member States' Consulates for citizens of 
Europe outside the territory of Europe.
Chapter VI concerns justice and sets out a number of 
established rights under four articles; the right to a fairo ' o
trial and effective remedy, the presumption of innocence 
and right of defence, the principle of proportionality and 
legality (non-retroactivity) and the right not to be tried or 
punished twice for the same offence.
Finally, Chapter VII, General Provisions, deals with the 
scope of the Charter, in the bodies and laws at which it is 
aimed, the scope of the rights within the Charter and the 
interaction between the Charter and other human rights 
instruments (whether international or domestic).
As is not uncommon with human rights, the expression 
of the rights varies considerably in terms of form or
O J
nature. Some articles appear purely declaratory in nature, 
(Article 20, '[ejveryone is equal before the law'), whilst 
others seem to engender individual rights, (Article 2.1 
states that "everyone has the right to life", Article 35 
recognises a right to healthcare). Others are prohibitory 
in nature (Article 5 prohibits slavery or forced labour).
The tone or expression differs between articles. In 
Article 22 it is stated that the Union 'shall respect cultural, 
religious and linguistic diversity'. Similarly, in Article 24 it 
is stated that children 'shall have the right to such 
protection and care as is necessary for their well-being'. 
These may be contrasted with the rights of the elderly and 
disabled whose rights the Union merely 'recognises and 
respects'. The expression of the latter lacks the force of 
the mandatory tone of the former. Similarly, the 
expression of some provisions refers to an "entitlement" 
(as in social security, A34) rather than a 'right' (A35 
recognises a right of access to health care).
Such variation in terminology is perhaps inevitable in 
view of the hybrid nature of the Charter rights. The 
interpretation ot such linguistic differences craves the 
attention of further academic and judicial 
pronouncements. A hierarchy may be sought within the 
Charter rights, perhaps hinted at in its structure or 
language. It mav be that the Charter is intended to be 29
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looked at as a whole. Another, common, problem is the 
interpretation of the interaction of the rights. The clash 
between the rights of privacy and expression under the 
ECHR is a familiar play in the courts. There are other 
potentially interesting alignments in the Charter; scientific 
research and environmental protection, the right to life 
and human dignity and the freedom of scientific research 
(which in part is anticipated in the Charter in the detailed 
provisions in Article 3 on the right to integrity of person, 
which includes express prohibitions on human cloning 
and eugenics).
The amount of detail within each right is also variable. 
The right to life stands on its own (although such
o v o
generality has given rise to much debate in the past). The 
right to integrity stands in contrast with detailed specific 
prohibitions in the field of medicine. As is common in 
human rights, many rights are expressed as broad 
statements of principle, leaving the detail to judicial 
interpretation.
Finally, the expression of many of the rights explicitly 
recognises and allows for a variation between Member 
States in the precise application of some of the rights. 
Hence, for example, the right to marry and found a family 
(Article 9), or die right to conscientious objection (Article 
10), are recognised, subject to national laws. Again, this 
echoes the international field of human rights and 
recognises the reality of diversity between nations.
While the rights may attach to the citizens of Europe 
(and with the exception of Chapter V many may be of 
universal application and so apply also to non-European 
residents), Article 51 clearly states that the provisions of 
the Charter are addressed to the institutions of the Union 
and to the Member States when implementing Union law.
In drafting the Charter, the Commission was anxious to 
attain clarity and certainty. By their very nature, however, 
many of the rights must remain vague and dynamic. The 
exact implications for rights and obligations in the 
European Community will need to be fashioned out by the 
judiciary or legislature, dependent on the future of the 
Charter, and in the global context of the ever growing 
jurisprudence of human rights.
THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ACQUIS 
COMMUNAUTAIRE AND NATIONAL LAWS
The Charter's basic source of legitimacy is the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which came into effect 1 May 1999 
and has established certain procedures, which intend to 
secure the protection of fundamental rights within the EU 
context. The Amsterdam Treaty consolidated the changes 
of direction in the European integration process brought 
about by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 
1992. In particular, it established as a general principle the 
obligation that the European Union should respect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as guaranteed by the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (Art 6.2 TEU). It 
also pronounced the principles upon which the European 
Union is founded, viz. the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
the rule of law (Art 6.1 TEU). Furthermore, to place 
emphasis on compliance of Member States with the above 
provision, the Amsterdam Treaty has allowed European 
institutions to suspend certain rights of member states 
deriving from the application of the Treaty, including the 
voting rights of member states, if a serious and persistent 
breach of fundamental rights and freedoms has been 
determined (Art 7 TEU). Alongside these compliance 
procedures, powers have been entrusted to the European 
Court of Justice to ensure respect of fundamental rights 
and freedoms by the European institutions (Art 46 TEU). 
Finally, as a precondition of any future accession to the 
European Union, prospective member states must 
recognise and respect the principles upon which the 
European Union is founded which are stipulated in Art 
6.1 (Art 49 TEU).
The aforementioned legal parameters have set the thrust 
of the legal status of the Charter. Many commentators 
believed that, as a result of the primary legitimacy of 
fundamental rights, the Charter should have been 
incorporated into the provisions of the Treaties and thus 
acquiring primary Community Eaw status. However, the 
momentum created by the Maastricht Treaty ol the 
European Union during the early 1990s to formally 
recognise matters of justice and home affairs was short 
lived. The law making structures to incorporate policies 
into law has been slow and cumbersome. The legal 
instruments chosen to incorporate justice and home 
affairs policies into European Community law were 
international conventions, requiring unanimity as a 
decision-making procedure and subsequent ratification by 
national parliaments. International conventions, as 
intergovernmental agreements lack the teeth of direct 
applicability or direct effectivity afforded to EU secondary 
legislation (Regulations, Directives and Decisions) and do 
not penetrate national legal orders automatically. The 
envisaged thrust of the fundamental rights in the 
Maastricht Treaty was considerably diluted, as a result of 
inappropriate law making structures.
Although the Amsterdam Treaty brought many justice 
and home affairs matters, including asylum and 
immigration policy and co-operation between civil courts 
under the traditional law making structure of the EU, as 
well as incorporated into European Union law the 
Schengen Agreement which eliminates borders between 
signatory states, the thrust of the Maastricht Treaty ou 
fundamental rights and freedoms was still restricted. To 
address this issue, the European Commission created a 
Directorate-General for Justice and Home Affairs and 
charged it with the responsibility to draw the Charter of
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Fundamental Rights in the European Union. A unique 
decision-making procedure was also utilised in the sense 
that an ad hoc agency (the Convention) was created by the 
European Council in late 1999, with wide membership 
from European and national institutions to drive the 
project through. The function of this agency has been 
remarkable in achieving in a relatively short time 
consensus amongst its members and a quality drafted 
Charter that resemble, to a large extent, and has the tenor 
of, continental constitutions.
The Charter is drafted clearly in a legal mode. The 
Convention, the body established to put flesh and bone on 
fundamental rights in the EU presented to the European 
Council in Nice a document, which, if the political will 
was there, it could be, easily incorporated into European 
Law. The Convention had two options: firstly, to prepare a 
Charter as if it was to be part of EU Law; secondly, to 
present a document of a political declaration summarising 
the fundamental rights in the EU. Many European 
Institutions were in favour of the formal incorporation of 
the Charter into the Treaties (see the Resolutions of the 
European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and 
the Economic and Social Committee). The Commission 
adopted a neutral position, leaving the option of legal 
endorsement of the Charter or its solemn political 
declaration to the European Council.
The Charter projects two basic objectives: i) the risibility 
of fundamental rights by the European citizen and ii) the 
certainty regarding the legal protection the Charter offers 
under European Union law. The relationship of the 
Charter with acquis communautaire balances three rules:
(1) the rule of autonomy
(2) the rule of compatibility
(3) the rule of subsidiarity.
The Charter must function in a parallel and harmonious 
way with the EU legal order. That function safeguards the 
autonomy of the Charter vis-a-vis international law and 
also the national law of the Member states. The Charter 
represents the first attempt of the EU to codify rights and 
freedoms of the individual citizen into the EU legal order, 
which strito sensu is an economic one. Autonomy is a 
precondition of the Charter's function and it is explicitly 
recognised as a rule in Article 52(3) of the Charter, where 
the standards of fundamental rights prescribed by the 
Charter are indicative and represent a minimum 
protection for the EU citizen. Acquis communautaire, 
national law or even international law may provide more 
extensive protection.
The Charter must also function in a compatible way 
with the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. 
There are two major risks associated with the parallel 
application of the Charter and the ECHR. The risk of
interpretation between provision of the two instruments 
and the risk of judicial divergence between the European 
Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights. 
Interpretational divergence represents a remote risk, as 
the Charter draws legitimacy from the ECHR on a number 
of occasions. The thrust of the Charter's provisions is 
complementary to those in the ECHR and the autonomy 
rule stipulated in Article 52(3) of the Charter helps in 
marking each instrument's application territorial or 
substantial as the case may be. Where the danger makes 
itself obvious is in the judicial application of the provisions 
of the two instruments. As different legal Jora are 
entrusted with the observance of the two regimes, 
theoretically the risk of judicial divergence remains intact. 
The fact that there is no formal link between the ECJ and 
the Court of Human Rights makes the risk of conflicting 
judgments even more realistic.
Finally, the principle of subsidiarity, established by the 
Maastricht Treaty must be balanced when the Charter is 
applied either in a political mode or in a legal mode. 
Subsidiarity and fundamental rights in the European 
Union introduce questions of relationship between the 
Charter and national constitutional legal orders. Although 
the Charter is based in a number of instances on freedoms 
and rights found in continental constitutions, the role of 
the institutions of member states, including national' o
constitutional courts is not clear vis-a-vis the application 
of the Charter and national constitutions. It might be the 
case that national constitutions have to be amended to 
align their orders with the Charter in a uniform way. If, 
and when the Charter is incorporated into EU law, that 
might be necessary, as the supremacy principle will make 
its presence into national legal orders.
The above analysis reveals the fact that the Charter 
operates in a variable geometry with Community law, 
international law and national law, balancing autonomy, 
compatibility and subsidiarity. This balancing exercise puts 
the Charter in the centre of attention and fuels the debate 
about its constitutional origin.o
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS AND 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union is an ambitious project that attempts to codify for 
the first time in the European integration process personal 
rights, including civil, political, economic and social rights 
and freedoms for the European citizen. This nexus of 
rights and freedoms derive from national, European and 
international legal instruments and is prominent of major 
principles such as human dignity, fundamental freedoms, 
equality, solidarity, justice and citizenship. The Charter 
also timely makes its contribution towards a transparent, 
accountable and effective administration at European 
level, by introducing the right of access to documents and
' J o o
the right to sound administration. 31
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These principles are interwoven with the economic 
dimension of European integration and for many 
commentators epitomise the completion of the objectives 
of the Treaties. The incorporation of the Charter into 
European law will formalise such vision. However, there 
are several doubting minds that feel the Charter will be an 
unnecessary burden in the common market law and policy 
making process that could potentially hinder labour 
flexibility and affect adversely the competitiveness of the 
members states. The Nice IGC was dominated by such 
doubts and for the time being the Charter received a 
solemn declaration of political nature.
The question relating to the legal status of the Charter 
was not adequately addressed at the Nice IGC. The 
Charter was prepared as a legal document capable of being 
incorporated into EU law. However, ranges of issues 
closely related to the Charter's legal thrust were not even
tackled amongst the members of the European Council. 
The Charter in it own right, even if incorporated into EU 
law needs substantial secondary legislation in the form of 
regulations, directives and decisions to produce the 
envisaged protection for the European citizen. 
Incorporation of the Charter into EU law is just the 
beginning of a very long process to elevate the individual 
as subject of EU law, to a position where his or her 
protection is guaranteed in a constitutional manner at 
European level under European law. ©
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